Spousal support is probably one of the most talked about issues when it comes to divorce.
It is one of those issues that is never resolved satisfactorily. The spouse who pays
it always pays too much, and the spouse who receives it never gets enough, and certainly
not for long enough. Once it has been set it seems to be the subject of ongoing strife.
The paying spouse (and frequently their new "significant other) awaits the day the
last check is to be sent, which never arrives early enough. The spouse receiving it
thinks the date should be extended. It is not uncommon for the parties to go back
and forth in the interim arguing over the amount and whether it should be adjusted.
To be sure, the appellate courts of our state have not consistently determined how
to handle it.
Now comes a new twist. Prior to last month it had been the generally accepted state
of the law in California that in drafting a prenuptial agreement there could be no
provision made concerning the issue of spousal support. Although parties could contract
concerning the property issues that would arise in their upcoming marriage, and although
they could negotiate their own arrangement concerning liabilities to modify existing
community property law, they could not negotiate any terms concerning the future disposition
of spousal support.
Now that may be changing. In the recent decision of Pendleton v. Firestone,
the Court of Appeal for the Second District determined that spousal support is something
that may be addressed in a prenuptial agreement. Unfortunately, although the decision
potentially opens the door for a potential resolution of this issue in advance of
marriage, the Pendleton case does not completely resolve the issue. Nonetheless
it is something to consider and it creates a potential problem for persons about to
enter into a prenuptial agreement and their lawyers.
Prenuptial agreements in California are governed by the state enactment of the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act which is in effect in most jurisdictions. The Act gives parties
the power to contract on just about all issues of a financial nature, but is silent
on the issue of spousal support. California case law held that a prenuptial agreement
which addressed spousal support provisions was void as against public policy because
it was "promotive of divorce". In other words, negotiating spousal support in advance
could give one spouse an incentive to divorce sooner, rather than later, especially
if divorcing sooner meant less of a financial liability in terms of the payment of
support.
In the Pendleton case, the appellate court saw no reason to follow that line
of thinking. Society has changed and divorce is significantly more prevalent today
than it was when the first cases addressed this issue at the beginning of this century.
Moreover, the treatment of divorce in a legal sense has changed as well. The legislature
abolished the requirement that grounds be proven for a divorce years ago. With the
abolition of fault, also came the abolition of the concept of unequal division of
property in order to compensate the aggrieved spouse. If women (the traditional recipients
of spousal support) were now equals in society, there seemed no logical reason that
they should not be able to contract regarding this issue, and they no longer needed
the protection of the courts in said regard. With that in mind, the appellate court
felt that there was no logical reason to deny parties the ability to contract on this
issue, just as they had the ability to contract on other issues relating to the marriage.
Furthermore, a review of the state of the law around the country revealed that many
states now permitted the contracting of an agreement concerning support. In fact,
only four states expressly precluded it.
Having considered all of the foregoing, the court found that there was no logical
reason to continue the policy prohibiting contracting spousal support rights.
However, that does not resolve the issue entirely. While the appellate court determined
that such a contract is not violative of public policy per se, it did not state
that the specific provision addressed in the Pendleton case was enforceable.
Rather, the court remanded that case to the trial court to determine whether or not
it would enforce the provision in this particular instance.
In Pendleton two wealthy and well educated individuals signed a prenuptial
agreement that waived spousal support in the event of a divorce. In the course of
the divorce proceedings, the wife asserted that the waiver was invalid under California
law and unenforceable. She requested an order for spousal support. At the time of
trial, Husband objected to the payment of support based on the terms of the prenuptial
agreement. The court overruled his objections and ordered support for the wife, believing
the waiver to be unenforceable. That ruling resulted in the appeal.
Unfortunately, the appellate court did not give any guidance in terms of what would
and would not constitute an enforceable waiver. Having left the question open, the
court has failed to give direction to persons signing such agreements in the future.
We do not yet know what the components for an enforceable waiver will be. Those components
may include the typical "knowing and intelligent" requirement applied in other contexts.
In plain language this means that the "waiving spouses" are aware that they are giving
up the right, and at the same time the consent to give up the right is understood.
However, there is an entirely separate body of law on what constitutes a valid waiver
in other situations and we do not yet know how that may affect these agreements.